A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: MIT

1) INTRODUCTION: WHY AND HOW TO REGULATE? Laffont and Tirole (1993, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) introduced 'favorableness' to compare two distribu. Theoretical models based on the assumption that telecommunications is a naturalmonopoly no longer A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Chapter 11 (you can skip Section 11.7), including “Bibliographic Notes” of A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. 11 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, ch. Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press. The Laffont and Tirole book A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a handy reference work, especially on the more technical issues. Academia.edu helps academics follow the latest research. An advanced textbook on regulation is.